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COMMENT: ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
INDEPENDENCE IN FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: CHECKS AND BALANCES, 
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT, AND OTHER 
INNOVATIONS 
MICHAEL S. BARR* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Financial regulation attempts to balance two competing administrative 
goals. On the one hand, as with much of administrative law, accountability is a 
core goal. Accountability undergirds the democratic legitimacy of 
administrative agencies. On the other hand, unlike with much of administrative 
law, independence plays a critical role.1 Independence helps to protect financial 
regulatory agencies from political interference and—with some important 
caveats—arguably helps to guard against some forms of industry capture. In 
addition, with respect to the Federal Reserve (the Fed), independence serves to 
improve the credibility of the Fed’s price stability mandate by insulating its 
decisionmaking from politics and, in particular, from the political pressure in 
favor of easy money during election cycles. 
These values, of course, are in tension. “Too much” accountability—at least 
in some forms—may reduce independence. “Too much” independence—at 
least in some forms—may reduce accountability. Moreover, steps to meet one 
or the other of these goals may also affect the efficacy of the organization. 
Having a financial regulatory system that properly balances accountability and 
independence, but fails to protect households from abuse and the real economy 
from the catastrophic failure of the financial sector, cannot be anyone’s goal. 
To foster accountability, scholars of administrative law have looked to 
congressional oversight, presidential control, and judicial review.2 Each of these 
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 1.  See Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving 
Relationship Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 
3, 2015 at 129. 
 2.  See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2246, 2253–72, 2281–
319 (2001) (describing several approaches to presidential administration). 
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has its own weakness and has been the subject of extensive academic debate, 
but, as has been pointed out elsewhere in this issue, this literature is often not 
concerned with, or even aware of, the literature discussing financial regulation.3 
Yet financial regulation often raises unique problems that may not neatly align 
with the literature on administrative law mechanisms of congressional 
oversight, presidential control, or judicial review. In the context of financial 
regulation, congressional oversight may be somewhat muted, for example, by 
the budgetary independence of most financial regulatory agencies. That 
budgetary independence is designed in part to reduce the ability of the financial 
industry to lobby Congress to cut or condition agency funding on particular 
enforcement or regulatory outcomes. Congress also tends to delegate to 
financial agencies significant, core questions regarding financial institution 
supervision, such as capital rules. Presidential control of financial agencies is 
often viewed with some suspicion, out of fear of improper political interference 
in enforcement and supervision, and since the New Deal, financial regulatory 
agencies have been given a great deal of independence through a range of 
practices.4 Although judicial review plays an important role in cabining financial 
agency action, such oversight exists at the edges, with significant aspects of 
financial regulation committed to agency discretion under broad congressional 
delegations. Many financial regulatory decisions involve probabilistic judgments 
about risk, such as whether a bank’s failure might lead to financial panics, which 
are not readily subject to judicial second-guessing. 
Moving from the mechanisms of oversight to its procedural norms, an 
important aspect of legitimacy is transparency and expertise: showing that the 
decisionmaking is based on the right substantive standard and arrived at 
through the right procedural means—on informed, data-driven expertise rather 
than on some arbitrary basis.5 An expertise-driven model began as a response to 
the market failures that spurred the Great Depression and the resulting demand 
for regulatory action.6 Unsurprisingly, administrative agency expertise is one of 
the primary factors shaping judicial review of agency action.7 Further, 
transparency in financial regulation has long been championed in the United 
States. Justice Brandeis, pointedly writing about the risks of oversized financial 
trusts, famously called sunlight “the best of disinfectants.”8 Transparency 
reinforces procedural norms and buttresses substantive outcomes by engaging 
 
 3.  See Gillian E. Metzger, supra note 1, at 130–31. 
 4.  See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive 
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 777 (2013).  
 5.  See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in 
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 515–53 (2003) (arguing that a model focusing more 
directly on arbitrariness, rather than presidential control, suggests new posibilities for solving the 
problem of agency legitimacy).  
 6.  Id. at 471. 
 7.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2072 
(1990).  
 8.  LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 89 (Melvin 
I. Urofksy ed., 1995) (1914).  
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the public. 
In addition, independence from political influence has been an important 
part of agency formation and an important measure of expertise-driven 
decisionmaking.9 The typical features identified in such agencies frequently 
include for-cause agency-head removal, tenure protection, and other measures, 
which vary significantly by agency.10 Historically, financial regulatory agencies, 
particularly the Fed, have retained independence from the Presidency.11 Even 
financial regulatory agencies, such as the SEC that lack explicit at-will removal 
protection, have come to be understood to enjoy removal protection simply by 
virtue of their functional role and objective.12 Although independence serves 
important values, a substantial drawback to multiagency independence in the 
financial regulatory context has been the problem of turf wars and conflicting 
approaches to regulation without a means of effective presidential coordination 
and dispute resolution.13 
Professor Kathryn Judge helpfully points out in this issue that soft norms 
can play an important role in reinforcing both independence and accountability. 
While acknowledging that independence and accountability can be in tension 
with one another, Judge argues that soft constraints, such as the reputation of 
the Fed Chair, or principles for conducting monetary policy, can reinforce the 
legitimacy of institutions that otherwise may not sufficiently reflect democratic 
values of accountability, without undermining agency independence.14 These 
soft constraints may help to mediate between these competing values without 
requiring Congress to have chosen sharply in favor of one or the other in any 
particular issue. Soft law itself, however, as Judge points out, may ossify into 
something less useful, pushing regulators to continue on a path that no longer 
makes sense;15 one of the defining reasons why Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke 
was successful in tackling the financial crisis from 2007 through 2009 was that he 
was willing to break free from the soft constraints of prior Fed policy and 
aggressively attack the panic.16 
In addition to balancing independence and accountability, the financial 
regulatory system has to produce results. At a minimum, that means protecting 
households, businesses, taxpayers and the real economy from abusive practices 
and catastrophic collapse. In the lead-up to the financial crisis of 2008, however, 
 
 9.  Datla & Revesz, supra note 4, at 770–71.  
 10.  Id. at 786, 789, 792, 797, 804.  
 11.  See Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 
504–05 (2000). 
 12.  Patrick Jiang, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB: In Which A Great Case Makes Bad Law, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 701, 725 (2012).   
 13.  See Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain Regulation: 
Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1434–35 (1991).  
 14.  See generally Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft Constraints, 78 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 65. 
 15.  Id. at 68–87.  
 16.  Id. at 78–84.  
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the financial sector piled ill-considered risk upon risk, held lower and lower 
levels of capital as a buffer against loss, engaged in practices that misled and 
harmed consumers and investors, and ultimately put the whole U.S. economy at 
risk. During this period, regulators failed to meet the basic substantive goals of 
financial oversight. 
In addition to soft law, other techniques may be used to mediate the tension 
between independence and accountability while maintaining a focus on efficacy. 
In particular, I want to briefly examine how regulatory checks and balances, 
public engagement, and other innovations can help to promote accountability 
while preserving independence. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the 
Obama Administration (in which I served) worked with Congress to enact 
major reforms aimed at substantively improving the safety of the financial 
system. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (Dodd–Frank) put in place new oversight of “shadow banking,” 
established a process to wind down major financial firms in the event of 
collapse, reined in risky derivative and other trading and financing activities, 
improved supervision of major financial firms, and strengthened consumer and 
investor protections. 
In doing so, Congress did not legislate on a blank slate, but instead sought to 
reform the existing regulatory infrastructure, which is decidedly non-Platonic in 
shape and form. Although Dodd–Frank was able to eliminate one of the worst 
performing regulatory agencies, the Office of Thrift Supervision, much of the 
superstructure of the financial regulatory system remained intact. Political turf 
battles in Congress and among the regulatory agencies meant that some 
common-sense changes to the financial “org chart,” such as merging the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC), or fully clarifying the bank supervisory 
responsibilities among the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) were 
impossible to achieve. That meant that Dodd–Frank had to use other methods 
to reduce opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, industry capture, and gaps in 
supervision and regulation. 
Moreover, even in countries that had much simpler regulatory structures, 
such as the United Kingdom, the financial crisis hit with devastating 
consequences. The UK had a “single peak” regulator before the crisis; that is, 
one regulatory body, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), regulated the 
entire financial services industry. In principle, this market-wide view would 
permit the regulator to see risks across the market and to respond to them 
quickly. In addition, the FSA was independent of the government and of the 
Bank of England. In principle, this independence would leave the FSA free to 
focus on the efficiency and safety of the financial system, without regard to 
monetary policy or political goals. In practice, the FSA was overwhelmed by the 
force of the financial crisis, and the Bank of England, which was called upon to 
provide liquidity to the system, was not sufficiently aware of the scale and scope 
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of the problems to be effective. Since the crisis, the UK has moved to a “twin 
peaks” model, with prudential regulation moved back within the Bank of 
England. Ideal organizational form, it appears, is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for preventing or fighting financial crises. 
In crafting Dodd–Frank, we consciously set out to develop and enact 
innovative ways of advancing the accountability, independence, and efficacy of 
the regulatory system, while working within severe political constraints of the 
legislative process. We focused on improving how regulators: (1) interact and 
coordinate, (2) respond to new and overlooked problems, (3) gather and assess 
information, and (4) remain accountable to the public. Although we could not 
eliminate turf battles, we sought methods to encourage or force better agency 
coordination; reduce or eliminate differences in the regulation of functionally 
similar products, services, or institutions; and reduce opportunities for races to 
the bottom in regulatory oversight. We sought to instill positive incentives for 
regulatory checks and balances, and to engage the public in increasing the 
accountability of the regulatory agencies. We also took those same values into 
account in crafting the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and 
Disclosure Act of 2009 (the CARD Act),17 which was designed to eliminate bad 
practices in the credit card markets. The remainder of this comment briefly 
outlines some examples of these administrative innovations, although, given 
space constraints, fuller exposition will need to await another time. 
II 
REGULATORY CHECKS AND BALANCES 
Given the fractured nature of the U.S. regulatory system, the Dodd–Frank 
Act created a new federal entity, the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC),18 to look out for risks across the financial system, designate 
systemically important firms and markets for heightened supervision and 
regulation regardless of the charter or corporate form of the financial entity, 
coordinate across regulatory agencies, and try to make sure that prudential 
standards promulgated by agencies are sufficiently robust to protect against 
systemic risk. The Council consists of the heads of the financial regulatory 
agencies, with the Secretary of Treasury serving as Chairperson, and each of the 
primary agency heads having one vote.19 Nonvoting members also participate in 
the Council. The FSOC’s authorities fill important gaps in the system and help 
to reduce the risk of regulatory arbitrage. 
The FSOC is given the authority to nudge the prudential regulators into 
action.20 If the Council determines that particular financial activities are creating 
 
 17.  Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 
Stat. 1734 (2009). 
 18.  12 U.S.C. § 5321(a) (2012). 
 19.  § 5321(b). 
 20.  § 5330. We initially favored a more robust approach, under which the FSOC could ultimately 
force the agency to raise standards. A number of agencies objected, in part arguing that the FSOC 
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or increasing the risk of significant stress to the nation’s financial markets, it is 
authorized to issue recommendations to the primary federal regulatory agencies 
to heighten their regulatory standards.21 The prudential regulators are required 
to put these recommendations into place, or to explain publicly why they are 
not implementing them.22 The FSOC must then report to Congress on the 
responsiveness of the regulator to its recommendations.23 This system enables 
the group of agency heads to place pressure on a recalcitrant or lagging member 
agency. It can also help to reduce the risk of uneven regulation among agencies. 
Furthermore, the public nature of the process enlists not only Congress but, 
perhaps more importantly, the public to exert pressure on the agency to act.24 
For example, in November 2012, the FSOC began taking public comment 
on a proposed recommendation to the SEC providing for three alternative 
options for reform to money market funds.25 This came just forty-seven days 
after SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro announced that, due to lack of support 
from a majority of commissioners, the SEC would be unable to advance 
proposed money market fund reforms.26 The SEC’s recalcitrance prompted the 
FSOC, under the urging of Treasury Secretary Geithner and SEC Chairman 
Schapiro, to issue its “Section 120 proposal.”27 Responding to this action, the 
SEC issued its own proposal on money market fund reforms.28 The SEC has 
finalized the rule, and although it falls far short of the FSOC’s proposals, the 
actions are at least more robust than those contemplated before the FSOC’s 
prodding. 
The FSOC also possesses the power to seek to resolve disputes between 
feuding agencies under its jurisdiction.29 To trigger this authority, agencies in a 
dispute must be unable to resolve the conflict through good faith effort, and one 
agency must provide a written request for the Council’s involvement.30 FSOC 
recommendations must provide a written explanation and must be approved 
through a two-thirds vote.31 The recommendations issued by the FSOC are 
 
might, under the guise of purporting to raise standards, actually lower them, while others simply sought 
to protect their turf under the guise of “independence” from the FSOC, on the grounds that it was 
chaired by a presidentially appointed Treasury Secretary. 
 21.  § 5330(a). 
 22.  § 5330(c)(2). 
 23.  § 5330(d).  
 24.  See generally Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New 
Administrative Process, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 689 (2013).  
 25.  FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2013 ANN. REP. 129 (2013).  
 26.  Dwight C. Smith, Money Market Funds: FSOC Proposes Reforms, HARV. LAW SCHOOL 
FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Dec. 9, 2012, 10:11 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/09/money-market-funds-fsoc-proposes-reforms/.  
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Money Market Fund 
Reforms (June 5, 2013) (on file with author).  
 29.  12 U.S.C. § 5329 (2012). 
 30.  § 5329(a).  
 31.  § 5329(b)–(c). 
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nonbinding,32 but create a forceful public statement that should place pressure 
on the parties to the dispute. 
In addition, the FSOC includes measures intended to maintain its 
accountability to both the President and Congress. Through the Secretary of the 
Treasury, who is also the Chair of the FSOC, the President retains important 
oversight of the FSOC.33 The FSOC also has annual reporting duties to 
Congress.34 The voting members of the Council are independently required to 
attest to their views of the FSOC’s efforts at mitigating systemic risk,35 and if the 
member believes that the Council is not up to the task, the member’s statement 
must outline the steps that they believe are necessary to be taken.36 
Additionally, the Secretary of the Treasury, in her capacity as Chair, must 
testify before Congress to discuss the annual report.37 
Dodd–Frank also created the Office of Financial Research (OFR), a new 
agency lacking its own “turf” in the sense that it does not directly supervise or 
regulate financial institutions. Instead, OFR is tasked with gathering 
information across the financial market, as well as providing research for the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council and its member agencies.38 It also has 
rulemaking authority to standardize and collect data from financial institutions 
and markets.39 Critically, OFR can act as an independent voice regarding 
financial stability, serving as a counterweight to the Fed and other supervisory 
agencies. In doing so, the OFR must report annually to Congress on threats to 
financial stability.40 A robust OFR could provide an important check and 
balance to other regulatory agencies, and provide incentives to them to improve 
their own performance or risk being called out.41 A dedicated OFR may also 
help regulation keep up with financial innovation and risk modeling.42 
The FSOC and OFR can serve as counterweights to the financial industry as 
well as to other regulatory agencies. The FSOC and OFR can help reduce risks 
from regulatory arbitrage in a fractured regulatory system by implementing a 
series of requirements for joint rulemaking, or alternatively, requirements that 
standards of one set of agencies be at least as stringent as another’s.43 “B team” 
analysis of systemic risk, the ability to gather data throughout the financial 
 
 32.  § 5329(d). 
 33.  § 5321(b)(1)(A). 
 34.  § 5322(a)(2)(N). 
 35.  § 5322(b). 
 36.  § 5322(b)(2). 
 37.  § 5322(c). 
 38.  § 5342–5343. 
 39.  § 5343(c). 
 40.  § 5344(d). 
 41.  Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd–Frank Financial Regulatory Reform: Strengths, 
Challenges, and Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 184 (2012). 
 42.  Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd–Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 549 (2011). 
 43.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 712(a)(8), § 731(e)(2), § 165(i)(2)(C), § 619, § 941(b), § 1471, § 205(h), § 
165(d)(8). 
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system (regardless of supervisory jurisdiction), and the ability to force public 
debate over regulatory standards and jurisdictional lines through public 
“nudges” may prove to be critical in a world in which the regulatory 
architecture is far from ideal and in which systemic risk analytics remain an 
uncertain and evolving field. Together with a newly invigorated Federal 
Reserve, charged with overseeing systemically important firms and markets, 
these new entities may help to reduce the risk that our next financial crisis 
crushes the real economy. 
III 
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT 
Public engagement is another key strategy to help independent agencies 
remain accountable, and to help them stay focused on substantive regulation 
that meets the needs of households and businesses. Dodd–Frank established a 
new agency to look out for the interest of households: the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB).44 Although formally housed within the Federal 
Reserve System to lessen political opposition to the creation of a new agency, 
the CFPB has strong, statutorily provided independence from the Fed (and the 
President) on policy, enforcement, budget, regulatory, and all other matters. 
Other features contributing to the CFPB’s independence include a single 
Director with a five-year term who is removable only for cause,45 and automatic 
funding through earnings of the Federal Reserve System, subject to a cap, 
rather than congressional appropriations.46 
Balanced against its independence are carefully crafted provisions to ensure 
that the Bureau remains publicly accountable for its accomplishments and 
failures. The Director is required to appear twice a year before the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the House 
Committees on Financial Services and Energy and Commerce.47 In anticipation 
of these meetings, the CFPB is required to compile a comprehensive report, to 
be submitted to the Committees and to the President.48 This report is required 
to include a discussion of obstacles to consumer financial well-being, a 
justification of the Bureau’s budget, a list of significant rules and orders adopted 
by the Bureau and the plans for the coming period, an analysis of consumer 
complaints, a list of supervisory and enforcement actions, an analysis of its 
actions taken with respect to nonbanks, and an analysis of efforts to meet 
diversity and fair lending objectives.49 This extensive array of reporting 
requirements forces the Bureau to demonstrate to Congress on a continuous 
basis that it is working to accomplish its mission. 
 
 44.  Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012). 
 45.  § 5491(b)–(d). 
 46.  § 5497(a). 
 47.  § 5496(a). 
 48.  § 5496(b). 
 49.  § 5496(c). 
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Another strategy to engage the public is through crowdsourcing of data. 
Although data collection is a traditional function of administrative agencies, 
Dodd–Frank broke new ground by coupling it with public engagement—for 
example, through the consumer complaint function. The Act mandates that the 
Bureau set in place procedures to provide consumers with timely responses to 
their complaints.50 Such complaints are to follow a particular procedure, 
whereby the complaints submitted are to be provided by the CFPB to the 
regulated entity, which in turn provides relevant information to the consumer.51 
The Bureau is required to provide a summary of the procedures taken and 
responses received.52 Further, it actively solicits consumer complaints53 and has 
handled hundreds of thousands of complaints over the last two years.54 
In addition to investigating individual consumer complaints,55 the CFPB uses 
the information from consumers to analyze and prioritize issues for supervisory, 
enforcement, and regulatory action.56 The CFPB also releases consumer-
complaint data publicly under its reporting duty.57 This database provides a new 
tool for the agency and the public to hold financial institutions accountable.58 
The CFPB also has new tools to engage private financial institutions in 
improving disclosures. For example, the CFPB can grant safe harbors to permit 
private firms to experiment with providing consumers with innovative 
disclosures that may better meet household needs than the current approach. 
The CARD Act also embodies reform through public engagement.59 Now 
administered by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the CARD Act 
utilizes information-gathering and publication procedures similar to those in the 
consumer-complaint mechanism.60 For example, the CARD Act amends the 
Truth in Lending Act to create new electronic disclosure requirements for 
credit card companies.61 Creditors are required to maintain a website on which 
all written credit card agreements must be provided.62 They are further required 
 
 50.  § 5534(a). 
 51.  § 5534(b)–(c). 
 52.  § 5534(b). 
 53.  See Submit a Complaint, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
 54.  2014 CFPB CONSUMER RESPONSE ANN. REP. at 12. 
 55.  Id. at 38. 
 56.  Id. at 2. 
 57.  See § 5496(c); see also Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).  
 58.  See Lee Drutman, A Win for Open Data: CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database, SUNLIGHT 
FOUNDATION (Apr. 22, 2013, 3:44 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/04/22/ 
consumer_complaint/.  
 59.  CARD Act Factsheet, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/credit-card-act/feb2011-factsheet/ (last visited Mar. 25, 
2015). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1632(d) (2012). 
 62.  § 1632(d)(1). 
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to turn over these contracts in electronic form to the CFPB.63 In turn, the CFPB 
is required to provide these contracts publicly on its site in a readily accessible 
form.64 Consumer advocacy organizations and third party vendors can use this 
data to put competitive pressure on firms to improve consumer protections and 
price transparency in credit card contracts. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The financial crisis sparked innovations in substantive financial regulation 
and administrative law designed to balance independence and accountability, 
while improving the efficacy of financial oversight. In many respects, these 
innovations acknowledge that our regulatory infrastructure is far from ideal, but 
they would be essential even in far simpler and perhaps more preferable 
regulatory structures. Only time will tell whether these innovations will be 
enough to overcome not only regulatory turf battles and congressional 
inattention or hostility, but also industry lobbying and the pace of financial 
innovation. The financial sector has already challenged a number of these 
policies, both in Congress and in the courts. Putting in place regulatory checks 
and balances, increasing transparency, and engaging the public can be bulwarks 
against complacency and the slide towards amnesia, willful or otherwise, about 
the causes and consequences of our most recent and brutal financial crisis. But 
the fight over financial reform is far from over, and whether the public will win 
out in the end is far from assured. Changing finance so that it is fairer and safer, 
and better harnessed to the needs of the real economy is, or ought to be, our 
shared challenge. 
 
 
 63.  § 1632(d)(2). 
 64.  § 1632(d)(3). 
